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Abstract—Authentication is vital for the Internet of Things
(IoT) applications involving sensitive data (e.g., medical and
financial systems). Digital signatures offer scalable authentication
with non-repudiation and public verifiability, which are necessary
for auditing and dispute resolution in such IoT applications.
However, digital signatures have been shown to be highly costly
for low-end IoT devices, especially when embedded devices (e.g.,
medical implants) must operate without a battery replacement
for a long time.
We propose an Energy-aware Signature for Embedded Med-
ical devices (ESEM) that achieves near-optimal signer efficiency.
ESEM signature generation does not require any costly operations
(e.g., elliptic curve (EC) scalar multiplication/addition), but
only a small constant-number of pseudo-random function calls,
additions, and a single modular multiplication. ESEM has the
smallest signature size among its EC-based counterparts with
an identical private key size. We achieve this by eliminating the
use of the ephemeral public key (i.e, commitment) in Schnorr-
type signatures from the signing via a distributed construction at
the verifier without interaction with the signer while permitting
a constant-size public key. We proved that ESEM is secure
(in random oracle model), and fully implemented it on an
8-bit AVR microcontroller that is commonly used in medical
devices. Our experiments showed that ESEM achieves 8.4× higher
energy efficiency over its closest counterpart while offering a
smaller signature and code size. Hence, ESEM can be suitable for
deployment on resource limited embedded devices in IoT. We
open-sourced our software for public testing and wide-adoption.
Index Terms—Lightweight Authentication, Internet of Things,
Digital Signatures, Embedded Devices.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is essential to provide authentication and integrity ser-
vices for the emerging Internet of Things (IoT) systems that
include resource-constrained devices. Due to their compu-
tational efficiency, symmetric key primitives (e.g., message
authentication codes) are usually preferred for such systems.
On the other hand, these primitives might not be scalable
for large and ubiquitous systems, and they also do not offer
public verifiability and non-repudiation properties, which are
essential for some IoT applications [1], [2], [3]. For instance,
in financial IoT applications and implantable medical devices,
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digital forensics (e.g., legal cases) need non-repudiation and
public verifiability [2], [3], [4]. Moreover, such systems may
include many devices that require scalability.
Digital signatures rely on public key infrastructures and
offer scalable authentication with non-repudiation and public
verifiability. Therefore, they are ideal authentication tools for
the security of IoT applications. On the other hand, most
of the compact digital signatures (e.g., elliptic curve (EC)
based signatures) require costly operations such as EC scalar
multiplication and addition during signature generation. It has
been shown [5], [6], [7], and further demonstrated by our
experiments that, these operations can be energy costly, and
therefore, can negatively impact the battery life of highly
resource-limited embedded devices. For instance, as one of the
many potential applications, we can refer to a resource-limited
sensor (e.g., a medical device [1]) that frequently generates
and signs sensitive data (medical readings), which are verified
by a resourceful cloud service provider. There is a need for
lightweight signatures that can meet the computation, memory
and battery limitations of these IoT applications.
The goal of this paper is to devise an energy-aware and
compact digital signature scheme that can meet some of the
stringent battery and memory requirements of highly resource-
limited IoTs (e.g., implantable medical devices) that must
operate for long periods of time with minimal intervention.
Design Objectives: (i) The signature generation should not
require any costly operation (e.g., exponentiation, EC op-
erations), but only symmetric cryptographic functions (e.g.,
pseudorandom functions) and basic arithmetics (e.g., modular
addition) (ii) The low-end devices are generally not only
computation/battery but also memory limited. Hence, the ob-
jective (i) should be achieved without consorting precomputed
storage (e.g., Boyko-Peinado-Venkatesan (BPV ) tables [8],
or online/offline signatures [9]). (iii) The signing should not
draw new randomness [10] to avoid potential hurdles of
weak pseudo-random number generators. (iv) The size of the
signature should be small and constant-size as in Schnorr-like
signatures. (v) The size of the public key should be constant.
Our Contributions: (i) We create an Energy-aware Signature
for Embedded Medical devices (ESEM), which is ideal for the
signature generation on highly resource-limited IoT devices.
We observe that the realizations of Schnorr-like signatures on
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TABLE I: Signature generation performance of ESEM and its counterparts on AVR ATmega 2560 microcontroller
Scheme CPU cycles Signing Speed (ms) Code Size (Byte) Signature Size (Byte) Private Key (Byte) CPU energy (mJ)
ECDSA 79 185 664 4949 11 990 64 32 494.91
BPV-ECDSA 23 519 232 1470 27 912 64 10 272 146.99
Ed25519 34 342 230 2146 17 373 64 32 214.64
SchnorrQ 5 174 800 323 29 894 64 32 32.34
ESEM 616 896 38 18 465 48 32 3.85
We use low-are implementations due to the memory constraints of ATmega 2560. Note that ESEM does not store any precomputed components (e.g., BPV tables)
efficient elliptic curves (e.g., FourQ [11]) are currently the
most efficient solutions, and a generation of the commitment
value via a scalar multiplication is the main performance
bottleneck in these schemes. Our main idea is to completely
eliminate the generation, storage, and transmission of this
commitment from the signing of Schnorr signature. To achieve
this, we first develop a new algorithm that we call as Signer
NOn-interactive Distributed BPV (SNOD-BPV), which permits
a distributed construction of the commitment for a given sig-
nature at verifier’s side, without requiring any interaction with
the signer. We then transform the signature generation process
such that the correctness and provable security are preserved
once the commitment value is separated from message hashing
and SNOD-BPV is incorporated into ESEM. We present our
proposed algorithms in Section III. In Section IV, we prove
that ESEM is secure in the random oracle model [12] under a
semi-honest distributed setting for SNOD-BPV.
(ii) We implemented ESEM and its counterparts both on an
AVR ATmega 2560 microcontroller and a commodity hard-
ware, and provided a detailed comparison in Section V. We
also conducted experiments to assess the battery consumption
of ESEM and its counterparts when they are used with common
IoT sensors (e.g., a pulse and pressure sensor). We make our
implementation open-source for broad testing and adoption.
Desirable Properties of ESEM: We summarize the desirable
properties of our scheme as follows (Table I gives a com-
parison of ESEM with its counterparts in terms of signing
efficiency on 8-bit AVR processor):
• Signing and Energy Efficiency: The signature generation
of ESEM does not require any EC operations (e.g., scalar
multiplication, addition) or exponentiation, but only pseudo-
random function (PRF) calls, modular additions and a single
modular multiplication. Therefore, ESEM achieves the lowest
energy consumption among their counterparts. For example,
ESEM consumes 8× and 55× less battery than SchnorrQ [11],
and Ed25519 [13], respectively. Our experiments indicate
that ESEM can substantially extend the battery life of low-
end devices integrated with IoT applications (see Section V).
Similarly, ESEM is at least a magnitude of times faster than
Ed25519 both in an 8-bit microcontroller and commodity
hardware. This gap further increases when our high-speed
variant ESEM2 (introduced in Section III) is considered.
• Small Private Key and Signature Sizes: ESEM has the
smallest signature size among its counterparts (48 Bytes for
κ = 128) with an identical private key size. ESEM does not
require any precomputation tables to be stored at the signer,
and therefore it is significantly more storage and computation
efficient than schemes relying on BPV at the signer’s side.
Moreover, ESEM has a small code size at the signer since it
only requires symmetric primitives and basic arithmetics.
• High Security: (i) Side-channel attacks exploiting the
EC scalar multiplication implementations in ECDSA were
proposed [14]. Since ESEM does not require any EC operations
at the signer, it is not vulnerable to these types of attacks. (ii)
The security of Schnorr-like signatures are sensitive to weak
random number generators. The signing of ESEM does not
consume new randomness (as in [10]), and therefore can avoid
these problems. (iii) We prove that ESEM is EU -CMA secure
in the random oracle model [12].
Potential Use-cases: In many IoT applications, extending the
battery life of low-end processors (i.e., usually signers) is a
priority, while verifiers generally use a commodity hardware
(e.g., a server) with reasonable storage and communication
capabilities. In particular, energy efficiency is a vital concern
for embedded medical devices, as they are expected to oper-
ate reliably for long periods of time. Currently, symmetric
cryptography is preferred to provide security for such de-
vices [15]. At the same time, the ability to produce publicly
verifiable authentication tags with non-repudiation is desirable
for medical systems [2], [3], [4] (e.g., digital forensics and
legal cases). Moreover, scalable integration of various medical
apparatus to IoT realm will receive a significant benefit from
the ability to deploy digital signatures on these devices [1].
ESEM takes a step towards meeting this need, as it is currently
the most energy efficient alternative with small signature and
private key sizes. Essentially, any IoT application involving
energy/resource limited signers and more capable verifiers
(e.g., wireless sensor networks and IoT sensors in smart cities)
are expected to receive benefit from ESEM.
Limitations: The signature verification of ESEM is distributed,
wherein a verifier reconstructs the commitment value of a
signature with l parties. Therefore, verification of ESEM is
not real-time, and the verifier should wait for a response from
all parties. However, as confirmed with our experiments, this
only results in a few milliseconds of delay. Moreover, the
signer does not need interaction with any parties to compute
signatures. Parties aiding the verification are assumed to be
semi-honest (do not deviate from the protocol, but try to
learn information) and non-colluding (as in traditional semi-
honest secure multi-party computation). In our case, even
(l−1) parties collude, ESEM remains EU-CMA secure. Since
ESEM is designed for a near-optimal signer performance, we
believe that ESEM is suitable for applications as outlined
above, where a small delay and interaction can be tolerated at
the verifier.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND MODELS
We first give the notations and definitions used by our
schemes, and then describe our system/security model.
A. Notation and Definitions
Notation: || and |x| denote concatenation and the bit length
of variable x, respectively. x $← S means variable x is
randomly selected from set S. |S| denotes the cardinality
of set S. We denote by {0, 1}∗ the set of binary strings of
any finite length. The set of items qi for i = 0, . . . , n − 1
is denoted by {qi}n−1i=0 . log x denotes log2 x. AO0,...,Oi(.)
denotes algorithm A is provided with oracles O0, . . . ,Oi. For
example, ASGN .Sigsk(.) denotes algorithm A is provided with
a signing oracle of algorithm Sig of signature scheme SGN
under a private key sk. We define a pseudo-random function
(PRF) and three hash functions to be used in our schemes as
follows: PRF0 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}κ, H0 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}κ,
H1 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}v·logn and H2 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q , where
1 < v < n are BPV parameters and κ is the security parameter.
Definition 1. A signature scheme SGN is a tuple of three
algorithms (Kg ,Sig ,Ver) defined as follows:
- (sk ,PK )← SGN .Kg(1κ): Given the security parameter
1κ, the key generation algorithm returns a private/public
key pair (sk ,PK ).
- σ ← SGN .Sig(m, sk): The signing algorithm takes a mes-
sage m and a sk , and returns a signature σ.
- b← SGN .Ver(m,σ,PK ): The verification algorithm takes
a message m, signature σ and the public key PK as input.
It returns a bit b: 1 means valid and 0 means invalid.
Our schemes are based on Schnorr signature [16].
Definition 2. Schnorr signature scheme is a tuple of three
algorithms (Kg ,Sig ,Ver) defined as follows:
- (y, Y )← Schnorr.Kg(1κ): Given 1κ as the input,
1) The system-wide params ← (q, p, α), where q and p
are large primes such that p > q and q|(p − 1), and a
generator α of the subgroup G of order q in Z∗p.
2) Generate private/public key pair (y $← Z∗q , Y ← αy mod
p). We suppress params afterwards for the brevity.
- (σ ← Schnorr.Sig(m, y): Given m ∈ {0, 1}∗ and y
as the input, it returns a signature σ = (s, e), where
H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q is a full domain hash function.
1) r $← Z∗q , R← αr mod p.
2) e← H(m||R), s← (r − e · y) mod q.
- b← Schnorr.Ver(m, 〈s, e〉, Y ): The signature verifica-
tion algorithm takes m, 〈s, e〉 and Y as the input. It
computes R′ ← Y eαs mod p and returns a bit b, with b = 1
indicating valid, if e = H(m||R′) and b = 0 otherwise.
We use Boyko-Peinado-Venkatesan (BPV ) generator [8].
Definition 3. The BPV generator is a tuple of two algorithms
(Offline,Online) defined as follows:
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Fig. 1: System Model of ESEM
- (Γ, v, n, q, p)← BPV .Offline(1κ): The offline BPV al-
gorithm takes 1κ as the input and generate system-wide
parameters (q, p, α) as in Schnorr.Kg(1κ).
1) BPV parameters n and v are the number of pairs to be
precomputed and the number of elements to be randomly
selected out n pairs, respectively, for 2 < v < n.
2) ri
$← Z∗q , Ri ← αri mod p, i = 0, . . . , n− 1.
3) Set precomputation table Γ = {ri, Ri}n−1i=0 .
- (r,R)← BPV .Online(Γ, v, n, q): The online BPV algo-
rithm takes the table Γ and (v, n, q) as input.
1) Generate a random set S ⊂ [0, n− 1], where |S| = v.
2) r ← ∑i∈S ri mod q, R← ∏i∈S Ri.
Lemma 1. The distribution of BPV output r is statistically
close to the uniform random distribution with an appropriate
choice of parameters (v, n) [8].
B. System and Security Model
As depicted in Figure 1, our system model includes a highly
resource-limited signer that computes signatures to be verified
by any receiver. Our system model also includes l distinct
parties (P1, . . . , Pl) that are involved in signature verification.
In the line of [17], after the initialization phase, we consider
a synchronous network which consists of a client (verifier in
ESEM) and semi-honest servers P = (P1, . . . , Pl). We assume
that the communication channels are secure.
The security notion for a digital signature is Existential Un-
forgeability against Chosen Message Attack (EU -CMA) [18].
Definition 4. EU-CMA experiment ExptEU-CMASGN for a signature
scheme SGN = (Kg,Sig,Ver) is defined as follows.
• (sk , pk)← SGN.Kg(1κ)
• (M∗, σ∗)← ASGN.Sig(·)(pk)
Awins the above experiment if 1← SGN.Ver(M∗, σ∗, pk)
and m∗ was not queried to SGN.Sig(·) oracle. The
EMU-CMA advantage AdvEU-CMASGN of Ais defined as
Pr[ExptEU-CMASGN = 1]
Definition 5. A protocol is t-private [17] if any set of parties
S with |S| ≤ t are not able to compute or achieve any output
or knowledge any different than what they could have done
individually from their set of private input and outputs.
Assumption 1. We assume that the servers are semi-honest -
always follow the protocol, but try to learn as much as possible
from the shared or observed information.
For t = l − 1, where l is the total number of the servers,
our proposed scheme is t-private. The signature generation in
our scheme does not require the participation of the servers. In
other words, the signer does not need to interact with any of
the l servers during the signature generation. The participation
of all l servers is however required on the verifier’s side.
III. PROPOSED SCHEMES
We first discuss the design challenges to achieve our
objectives outlined in Section I. We elaborate our Signer
NOn-interactive Distributed BPV (SNOD-BPV) algorithm that
addresses some of them. We then present ESEM that uses
SNOD-BPV and other strategies to achieve our objectives.
A. High-Level Design
Schnorr-like signatures with implementations on recent ECs
(e.g., FourQ [11]) are currently among the most efficient and
compact digital signatures. Hence, we take them as our starting
point. In these schemes, the signer generates a random value r
and its commitment R = αr mod p, which is incorporated into
both signing and verification (as an input to hash along with
a message). This exponentiation (EC scalar multiplication)
constitutes the main cost of the signature generation, and
therefore we aim to completely eliminate it from the signing.
However, this is a highly challenging task.
1) Commitment Generation without Signer Interaction:
The elimination of commitment R from the signing permits re-
moval of EC operations such as scalar multiplication/additions.
It also eliminates the transmission of R and a storage of
BPV table at the signer. However, the commitment is neces-
sary for the signature verification. Hence, the verifier should
obtain a correct commitment for each signature with the
following requirements: (i) The verifier cannot interact with
the signer to obtain the commitment (i.e., the signer does
not have it). (ii) The signer non-interactive construction of
the commitment should not reveal the ephemeral randomness
r. (iii) Unlike some multiple-time signatures [6], the verifier
should not have a fixed limit on the number of signature
verifications and/or a linear-size public key.
We propose a new algorithm that we refer to as
SNOD-BPV, to achieve these requirements. Our idea is to
create a distributed BPV technique that permits a set of
parties to construct a commitment on behalf of the signer.
This distributed scheme permits the verifiers to obtain the
corresponding commitment of a signature from these parties
on demand without revealing r or an interaction with the
signer. We elaborate on SNOD-BPV in Section III-B.
2) Separation of the Commitment from Signature Genera-
tion with SNOD-BPV: The commitment value is generally used
as a part of message hashing (e.g., H(M ||R) in Schnorr) in
Schnorr-like signatures. To eliminate R from the signature, the
commitment must be separated from the message. However,
the use of commitment in the message hashing plays a role
in the security analysis of Schnorr-like signatures. Moreover,
the removal of commitment R from the signing while using r
with SNOD-BPV algorithm requires a design adjustment.
We propose our main scheme ESEM that achieves these
goals. In the line of [6], we use a one-time random value x in
the message hashing, but also devise an index encoding and
aggregate BPV approach to integrate SNOD-BPV into signature
generation. This permits a constant-size public key at the
verifier without any interaction with the signer. We give the
details of ESEM in Algorithm 2.
B. Signer NOn-interactive Distributed BPV (SNOD-BPV)
We conceive SNOD-BPV as a distributed realization of
BPV [8] where l parties hold n public values {Ri,j}n,li=1,j=1 of
l BPV tables, and then can collaboratively derive R without
learning its corresponding private key r unless all of them
collude. We stress that one cannot simply shift the storage
of public values in a BPV table to a single verifier. This
is because the indexes needed to compute the commitment
R should remain hidden in order to protect the one-time
randomness r [19]. We overcome this challenge by creating
a distributed BPV approach that can be integrated into a
Schnorr-like signature. At SNOD-BPV.Offline, in Step 2,
the secret key y is used as a seed to derive l secret values
{zj}lj=1. Each zj is used to deterministically generate secret
BPV values {ri,j}n,li=1,j=1, whose corresponding public values
{Ri,j}n,li−1,j=1 are computed in Step 4-5 and given to parties
(P1, . . . , Pl).
At the online phase, the sender (i.e., signer) generates
the aggregated r on its own and the receiver (i.e., verifier)
generates the aggregated R cooperatively with the parties
(P1, . . . , Pl). The sender first derives a random value x
from a keyed hash function (at SNOD-BPV.Sender Step
1), and then deterministically derives zj values (Step 3) as
in SNOD-BPV.Offline. Sender uses the zj , that is only
shared with the corresponding party, and the one-time random
value x to generate the set (indexes) to be used to aggregate
the values. This step is of high importance since this way,
the sender commits to the one-time random value x. Sender
repeats this process for all l parties and aggregates (adds) all
the corresponding ri,js to derive the resulting r (Step 5).
The verifier proceeds as follows to generate the correspond-
ing R = αr mod p. At Step 1 in SNOD-BPV.Receiver, the
verifier communicates with l parties to derive each Rj from
them. Upon request, parties first derive the same set (indexes)
as the sender (Step 1 in SNOD.Pj-Construct). Then, each
party aggregates the corresponding Ri,j that were assigned
to them in SNOD-BPV.Offline, and returns the results to
the verifier. The verifier aggregates all these values at Step
2, to derive the corresponding R. Please note that only the
parties can create the set (indexes) since only they have their
corresponding zj values. Moreover, since all servers provide
Rj that can be generated only by them, unless all of the servers
collude, they cannot learn any information about the other
indexes or the one-time randomness r. This makes our scheme
t-private, as shown in Lemma 2.
C. Energy-aware Signature for Embedded Medical devices
We summarize our main scheme ESEM (see Algorithm
2), which permits a near-optimal signing by integrating
SNOD-BPV into Schnorr signature with alternations.
Algorithm 1 Signer NOn-interactive Distributed BPV
(SNOD-BPV)
(A1, . . . , Al)← SNOD-BPV.Offline(1κ, y, v, n):
Given 1κ, secret key y, and parameters (v, n) generate
precomputation tables.
1: for j = 1, . . . , l do
2: zj ← PRF0(y||j)
3: for i = 1, . . . , n do
4: ri,j ← PRF0(zj ||i)
5: Ri,j ← αri,j mod p
6: Set Aj = (zj , v, 〈R1,j , . . . , Rn,j〉)
7: return each Aj to corresponding party Pj
(r, x)← SNOD-BPV.Sender(sk):
1: x← H0(sk||c), c← c+ 1
2: for j = 1, . . . , l do
3: zj ← PRF0(sk||j)
4: (i1,j , . . . , iv,j)← H1(zj ||x)
5: r ← ∑vk=1∑lj=1 PRF0(zj ||ik,j) mod q
6: return r
R¯j ← SNOD.Pj-Construct(Aj , x): Given x and Aj ,
each party Pj returns R¯j .
1: (i1,j , . . . , iv,j)← H1(zj ||x)
2: R¯j ←
∏v
k=1Rik,j ,j mod p
R← SNOD-BPV.Receiver(x) Given x, retrieve its
commitment R under PK from (P1, . . . , Pl).
1: Verifier sends x to the parties, and each party Pj returns
R¯j ← SNOD.Pj-Construct(Aj , x) for j = 1, . . . , l.
2: R← ∏lj=1 R¯j mod p
3: return R
During key generation, secret/public key pair (y, Y ) and
BPV parameters are generated (Step 1-2), followed by
SNOD-BPV.Offline(·) algorithm to obtain the distributed
BPV public values to be stored by parties (P1, . . . , Pl). In
ESEM.Sig(·), the signer generates the ephemeral random
value r and one-time randomness x to be used as the com-
mitment. Instead of the commitment in Schnorr (R), the
signer uses x as the commitment in Step 2. This separation
of the commitment R from the message hashing is inspired
from [6]. Note that, unlike the multiple-time signature in [6]
that can only compute a constant pre-determined number of
signatures with a very large linear-size public key, ESEM can
compute polynomially unbounded number of signatures with
a constant public key size. Finally, the verifier first calls the
SNOD-BPV.Receiver(·) algorithm to generate the public
value R, by collaborating with the parties. The signature
verification, which is similar to Schnorr with the exception
of the commitment x, is performed at Step 2.
1) ESEM2: We point out a trade-off between the private
key size and signing speed, which can increase the signature
generation performance with the cost of some storage. The
Algorithm 2 Energy-aware Signature for Embedded Medical
devices (ESEM)
(sk ,PK , A1, . . . , Al)← ESEM.Kg(1κ):
1: (y, Y ) ← Schnorr.Kg(1κ), where (q, p, α) as in
Schnorr.Kg.
2: Select (v, n) such that
(
n
v
) ≥ 2κ
3: (A1, . . . , Al)← SNOD-BPV.Offline(1κ, y, v, n)
4: The signer stores sk = (y) and (v, n, q, c = 0). The
verifier stores PK = Y and (v, n, q, p, α).
σ ← ESEM.Sig(m, sk):
1: (r, x)← SNOD-BPV.Sender(y)
2: s← r −H2(m||x) · y mod q
3: return σ = (s, x).
{0, 1} ← ESEM.Ver(m,σ,PK ):
1: R← SNOD-BPV.Receiver(x)
2: if R = Y H2(m||x) · αs mod p, return 1, else return 0.
signer can store private keys {ri,j}n,li=1,j=1 in the memory,
and therefore avoid v · l PRF invocations. We refer to this
simple variant as ESEM2. As demonstrated in Section V,
an extra storage of 12 KB can boost the performance of
ESEM commodity hardware.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Lemma 2. The scheme proposed in Algorithm 1 is t-private
(in the sense of Definition 5) with regard to r and therefore,
it can resist against l − 1 colluding servers.
Proof. The random values {ri,j ← PRF0(zj ||i)}l,nj=1,i=1
are generated uniformly at random in the
SNOD-BPV.Offline(·) via private seed zj , which is
given to each server Pj . The security of SNOD-BPV (i.e.,
ESEM) relies on the secrecy of r ← ∑li=1∑nj=1 ri,j mod q.
Given each ri,j is generated uniformly at random via zj’s,
and due to Lemma 1, for the adversary Ato infer r, it must
know all l private seeds zj or corrupt all of the l servers.
Theorem 1. In the random oracle model, based on As-
sumption 1 and Lemma 2, if a polynomial-time adversary
Acan break the EU-CMA security of ESEM in time t and
after qh hash and qs signature queries, then one can build
polynomial-time algorithm F that breaks the EU-CMA security
of Schnorr signature in time t′ and q′s signature queries.
AdvEU -CMAESEM (t, qh, qs) ≤ AdvEU -CMASchnorr (t′, q′s),
Proof: Please refer to the Appendix.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
A. Parameter Selection
We select FourQ curve [11] that offers fast elliptic curve op-
erations (that is desirable for our verification process, remark
that signer has no EC operations) with 128-bit security level.
The selection of parameters (v, n) relies on the number of v-
out-of-n different combinations possible. We select n = 1024,
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Fig. 2: Energy consumption of signature generation vs IoT sensors
v = 18 for ESEM and n = 128, and v = 40 for ESEM2, where
both offers over 2128 different combinations. Lastly, we select
l = 3 (i.e., 3 parties are involved in verification).
B. Evaluation Metrics and Experimental Setup
Evaluation Metrics: We implemented ESEM and its counter-
parts both on the low-end device (8-bit microcontroller) and
a commodity hardware. (i) At the signer’s side, the signature
generation time and private key size were evaluated on both
types of devices. The energy consumption and code size were
evaluated on a low-end device. (ii) The signature size is
evaluated as the communication overhead. (iii) At the verifier’s
side, the signature verification time and the size of public key
were evaluated on the commodity hardware.
Note that the time required to transmit the ESEM signature
(only 48 Bytes) is already smaller than all of its counterparts.
Therefore, we do not include this in our experiments. The
bandwidth overhead to construct R between the verifier and l
parties is only 48 Bytes, and highly depends on the geographic
location of the server (i.e., round trip time). We conservatively
benchmark this network delay and include in our signature ver-
ification time, with an Amazon EC2 server in North Virginia.
Hardware Configurations and Software Libraries: We
selected AVR ATmega 2560 microcontroller as our low-end
device due to its low power consumption and extensive use in
practice, especially for medical devices [1], [2], [20]. It is an 8-
bit microcontroller with 256 KB flash memory, 8 KB SRAM,
4 KB EEPROM and maximum clock speed is 16 MHz.
We implemented our schemes using Rhys Weatherley’s
library1, which enables Barrett reduction to compute modulo
q. We used BLAKE2s [21] as our hash function from the
same library, since it is optimized for low-end devices in terms
of speed and code size. We instantiated our PRF function as
CHACHA20 stream cipher [22] which offers high efficiency.
To assess our counterparts, we used ECDSA implementation in
microECC2, with which we also implemented BPV-ECDSA.
We used the implementations on same microcontroller to
assess Ed25519 [23] and SchnorrQ [24].
1https://github.com/rweather/arduinolibs/tree/master/libraries/Crypto
2https://github.com/kmackay/micro-ecc
We powered the microcontroller with a 2200 mAh power
pack. ATmega 2560 operates at a voltage level of 5 V and takes
20 mA current3. We verified the current readings taken from
datasheets by connecting an ammeter between the battery and
ATmega 2560, and we observed an insignificant difference.
Therefore, we measured the energy consumption with the
formula E = V · I · t where t is the computation time. To
account the variations in time t, we run each scheme 104 times
and took the average.
We also investigated the effect of cryptography on the
battery life in some real-life IoT applications. For this purpose,
we measured the energy consumption of a pulse sensor4 and
a BMP183 pressure sensor5. We expect that the pulse and
pressure sensors provide some ideas on the use of digital
signatures with sensors in medical devices and daily IoT
applications, respectively.
• Commodity Hardware: We used an Intel i7-6700HQ
2.6 GHz processor with 12 GB of RAM as the commodity
hardware in our experiments. We implemented the arithmetic
and curve operations of our scheme with FourQlib6. We used
BLAKE2b [21] as our hash function since it is optimized
for commodity hardware. Lastly, we instantiated our PRF
with AES in counter mode using Intel intrinsics. For our
counterparts, we used their base implementations.
As the semi-honest party, we used an Amazon EC2 instance
located in North Virginia. Our EC2 instance was equipped with
an Intel Xeon E5 processor that operates at 2.4 GHz.
Our implementations are open-sourced at:
www.github.com/ozgurozmen/ESEM
C. Performance Evaluation and Comparisons
Low-end Device: Table I shows the results obtained from our
implementations on 8-bit AVR ATmega 2560.
• Signature Generation Speed: ESEM has the fastest signing
speed, which is 8.4× and 55× faster than that of SchnorrQ
and Ed25519, respectively.
3http://www.atmel.com/Images/Atmel-2549-8-bit-AVR-Microcontroller-
ATmega640-1280-1281-2560-2561_datasheet.pdf
4https://pulsesensor.com/
5https://cdn-shop.adafruit.com/datasheets/1900_BMP183.pdf
6https://github.com/Microsoft/FourQlib
TABLE II: Experimental performance comparison of ESEM schemes and their counterparts on commodity hardware
Scheme SigningTime (µs)
Private Key¶
(Byte)
Signature
Size (Byte)
Verifier
Comp. (µs)
Verifier
Storage (Byte)
Server
Comp. (µs)
Server
Storage (KB)
End-to-End
Delay† (µs)
ECDSA 725 32 64 927 32 − − 1652
BPV-ECDSA 149 10272 64 927 32 − − 1076
Ed25519 132 32 64 336 32 − − 468
SchnorrQ 12 32 64 22 32 − − 34
ESEM 11 32 48 24 32 5 32784 11 + 24 + 5 + ∆
ESEM2 4 12416 48 24 32 10 4112 4 + 24 + 10 + ∆
¶ System wide parameters params (e.g., p,q,α) for each scheme are included in their corresponding codes, and private key size denote to specific private key size.
† ∆ represents the communication between the verifier and servers. Since the verifier communicates with l = 3 servers, the maximum communication delay is included in our
end-to-end delay. This communication is measured to be 37 ms on average by our experiments, with an Amazon EC2 instance in N. Virginia.
• Energy Consumption of Signature Generation: With a
2200 mAh battery, ESEM can generate nearly 800000 signa-
tures, whereas SchnorrQ, Ed25519 and ECDSA can generate
only 94482, 14235 and 6173 signatures, respectively. This
shows that, ESEM can generate significantly higher number
of signatures with the same battery.
• Energy Consumption of Signature Generation versus IoT
Sensors: We considered a pulse and a pressure sensor to
exemplify the potential medical and home automation IoT
applications, respectively. We selected the sampling time (i.e.,
the frequency of data being read from the sensor) as every
10 seconds and every 10 minutes for the pulse and pressure
sensor, respectively, to reflect their corresponding use-cases.
We measured the energy consumption by considering three
aspects: (i) Each sensor by default draws a certain energy
as specified in its datasheet. The pulse sensor operates at
3 V and draws 4.5 mA of current, while pressure sensor
operates at 2.5 V and draws 5 µA of current. These values are
multiplied by their corresponding sampling rates to calculate
the energy consumption of the sensor. (ii) AVR ATmega 2560
consumes energy to make readings from the sensor as well
as during its waiting time. We measured the time that takes
the microcontroller to have a reading from the sensor as 1
ms. Therefore, we calculated the energy consumption of the
microcontroller on active time as 5V · 20mA · 1ms. (iii)
ATmega 2560 requires 10 µA in power-save mode, which is
used to calculate the energy consumption in the idle time.
We compared the energy consumption of signature genera-
tion and IoT sensors in Figure 2. ESEM reduces the energy
consumption of signature generation to 2.76% and 9.29%
compared to that of pulse and pressure sensors, respectively.
Observe that, compared with the pressure sensor, SchnorrQ
as the fastest counterpart of ESEM, requires 46.24%, while
Ed25519 demands 85.09% of the energy consumption. When
the pulse sensor is used, while ESEM requires an almost
negligible energy consumption (2.76%), its closest counter-
part requires 19.29%. The energy efficiency of ESEM also
translates into longer battery life in these applications. More
specifically, when pressure sensor is deployed with ESEM, it
takes 511 days to drain a 2200 mAh battery, while it is 303
days for our closest counterpart (SchnorrQ).
Our experiments show that the existing ECC-based digital
signatures consume more energy than IoT sensors, which make
them the primary source of battery consumption. On the other
hand, ESEM was able to reduce the signature generation
overhead to a potentially negligible level in some cases, at
minimum offering improvements over its counterparts.
Commodity Hardware: The benchmarks of ESEM and its
counterparts on commodity hardware are shown in Table II.
• Signature Generation: ESEM and ESEM2 schemes offer
the fastest signature generation on commodity hardware as
well. Especially ESEM2 (the high-speed variant where private
key components are stored instead of generating them from a
seed), is 3× faster than its closest counterpart.
• Signature Verification: The signature verification in
ESEM includes verifier computation, server computation and
communication between the verifier and servers. Due to the
computational efficiency of FourQ curve, verifier and server
computation of ESEM verification is highly efficient. Specifi-
cally, verifier computation takes 24 µs in ESEM and ESEM2;
and server computation takes 5 µs, and 10 µs for ESEM and
ESEM2, respectively. The communication between server and
verifier is experimented with our commodity hardware and an
Amazon EC2 instance at N. Virginia. This delay was measured
as 37 ms on average.
The fastest verification is observed at SchnorrQ scheme, that
is 22 µs. This scheme should be preferred if the verification
speed is of high importance. However recall that for our en-
visioned applications, the signer efficiency (energy efficiency)
is of top priority and a small delay at the verifier is tolerable.
VI. RELATED WORK
There are two main lines of work to offer authentication for
embedded medical devices: symmetric key primitives (e.g.,
MACs) and public key primitives (e.g., digital signatures).
In this section, we only mention lightweight digital signature
schemes that are most relevant to our work.
One-time signatures (e.g., [6], [25], [26]) offer high com-
putational efficiency, but usually have very large key and sig-
nature sizes that hinder their adoption in implantable medical
devices. Moreover, they can only sign a pre-defined number
of messages with a key pair, which introduce a key renewal
overhead. The extensions of hash-based one-time signatures to
multiple-time signatures (e.g., SPHINCS [27]) have high sign-
ing overhead, and therefore are not suitable for medical im-
plantables. Some MAC based alternatives (e.g., TESLA [28],
[29]) use time asymmetries to offer computational efficient and
compactness, they cannot offer non-repudiation and require a
continuous time synchronization. EC-based digital signatures
(e.g., [11], [13], [24], [30], [31], [32]) are currently the most
prevalent alternatives to be used on embedded devices due
to their compact size and higher signing efficiency compared
to RSA-based signatures (e.g., CEDA [33]). We provided a
detailed performance comparison of ESEM with its most recent
EC-based alternatives in Section V.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed ESEM, that achieves the least
energy consumption, the fastest signature generation along
with the smallest signature among its ECC-based counterparts.
ESEM is also immune to side-channel attacks aiming EC
operations/exponentiations as well as to weak pseudo random
number generators at the signer’s side, since ESEM does not
require any of these operations in its signature generation algo-
rithm. We believe ESEM is highly preferable for applications
wherein the signer efficiency is a paramount requirement, such
as implantable medical devices. We implemented ESEM and its
counterparts both on a resource-contrained device commonly
used in medical devices and a commodity hardware. Our ex-
periments validate the significant energy efficiency and speed
advantages of ESEM at the signer’s side over its counterparts.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof: If a polynomial-time adversary A breaks the EU-
CMA security of ESEM, then one can build another
polynomially-bounded algorithm F that runs A as a
subroutine and breaks Schnorr signature. After setting
(y, Y ) ← Schnorr.Kg(1κ) and the corresponding parame-
ters (q, p, α), F is run as in Definition 4 as follows. F handles
A’s and other queries in Definition 4.
Algorithm FSchnorr.Sigy(·)(Y ):
• Setup: F maintains five lists LM, HL0, HL1, HL2 and
LW , all initially empty. LM is a message list that records
each message M to be queried to ESEM.Sig(·) oracle by
A. HL0, HL1 and HL2 record the input x to be queried
to RO(·) oracle and its corresponding RO(·) answer h,
respectively. h ← HLi(x), for i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, returns the
corresponding RO(·) answer of x stored in HLi. LW keeps
the record of messages that F queries to Schnorr.Sig or-
acle. F sets up RO(·) and simulated public keys to initialize
ESEM.Sig oracle as follows:
- Setup RO(·) Oracle: F implements a function H -Sim to
handle RO(·) queries. That is, the cryptographic hash func-
tion H is modeled as a random oracle via H -Sim as follows.
h ← H -Sim(x,HLi): If h ∈ HLi, for i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, then
H -Sim returns the corresponding value h ← HLi(M).
Otherwise, it returns h $← Z∗q as the answer, inserts (M,h)
into HLi, respectively.
- Setup Simulated Keys: F selects parameters (v, n) as in
ESEM.Kg(·) Step 1, and works as follows:
1) Queries Schnorr.Sigy(·) on wj $← Z∗q , and receives
signatures (s′j , h
′
j), where {R′j ← Y h
′
j ·αs′j mod p}n−1j=0 .
2) Sets PK ← Y and system-wide public parameters
(v, n, q, p, α) as in ESEM.Kg(·).
3) Sets z ← {0, 1}κ and γ = {s′j , h′j}n−1j=0 and β =
{R′j}n−1j=0 and inserts {wj}n−1j=0 into LW . F also inserts
{wj ||R′j , h′j}n−1j=0 into HL2. F sets the counter c← 0.
• Execute (M∗, σ∗)← ARO(·),ESEM.Sigsk (·)(PK ): F han-
dles A’s queries and forgery as follows:
- Queries of A: A queries RO(·) and ESEM.Sigsk(.) on any
message of its choice up to qh and qs times, respectively.
1) Handle RO(·) queries: A queries RO(·) on a message
M . F calls h← H -Sim(M,HL2) and returns h to A.
2) Handle ESEM.Sig(·) queries: A queries
ESEM.Sigsk(·) on any message of its choice M .
If M ∈ HL1 then F aborts. Otherwise, F inserts M
into LM and then continues as follows.
i) x ← H -Sim(z||c,HL0), (k0, . . . , kv−1) ←
H -Sim(z||x,HL1), and fetch {s′ki , h′ki}v−1i=0 from γ.
ii) h ← ∑v−1i=0 h′ki mod q, s ← ∑v−1i=0 s′ki mod q, put
(M ||x, h) in HL2 and return σ = (s, x) to A.
- Forgery of A: Finally, A outputs a forgery for PK as
(M∗, σ∗), where σ∗ = (s∗, x∗). By Definition 4,
A wins the EU -CMA experiment for ESEM if
ESEM.Ver(M∗, σ∗,PK ) = 1 and M∗ /∈ LM.
• Forgery of F : If A fails, F also fails and returns 0.
Otherwise, given an ESEM forgery (M∗, σ∗ = 〈s∗, x∗〉) on
PK , F checks if M∗||x∗ /∈ HL1, or x∗ /∈ HL0 holds,
F aborts. Otherwise, using the forking lemma [34], [35],
F rewinds A with the same random tape, to get a new forgery
(M∗, σ˜ = 〈s˜, x˜ 〉). Given, both forgery pairs are valid, we have:
R∗ ≡ (αy)h∗ · αs∗ mod p
R∗ ≡ (αy)h˜ · αs˜ mod p
These equations imply the below modular linear equations.
r∗ ≡ y · h∗ + s∗ mod q
r∗ ≡ y · h˜ + s˜ mod q
F then extracts Schnorr private key y by solving the
above modular linear equations (note that only unknowns are
y and r∗). F can further verify Y ≡ αy mod p. Given that
F extracted the Schnorr private key, it is trivial to show that
F can produce a valid forgery on any message M∗∗ /∈ LW
of its choice on Schnorr public key Y . Therefore, F wins
EU -CMA experiment for Schnorr and returns 1.
Probability Analysis & Transcript Indistinguishability:
F may abort during simulation when A queries the
ESEM.Sig(·) oracle, if randomly chosen indexes
(k0, . . . , kv−1) already exist in HL1. The probability
that happens is (qh−1)qs/2l, l = v · log n. Based on [35,
Lemma 1], we define the success probability of A as ACC.
This probability is defined as ACC ≥ A − (qh−1)qs/2l. Where
A is the winning probability of A. The probability of F (i.e.,
F ) for breaking Schnorr is given by:
F ≥ ACC
2
qh + qs
− 1
2l
≥ 
2
A
(qh + qs)
− 2((qh − 1)qs)
2l(qh + qs)
A’s view in Algorithm 2 is the public key PK , signatures
(σ1, . . . , σqs−1) and hash outputs. The public key in the
simulation has the identical distribution as the one in original
ESEM - they are both the output of the Schnorr.Kg(·) al-
gorithm. As for the signatures, σ = (s, x), both elements s
and x have the same distribution as in the original scheme.
